Measuring Movement of Incomes by Fields, Gary S & Ok, Efe A
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
1999 
Measuring Movement of Incomes 
Gary S. Fields 
Cornell University, gsf2@cornell.edu 
Efe A. Ok 
New York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Income Distribution Commons, International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, 
and the Labor Economics Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Measuring Movement of Incomes 
Abstract 
We consider a small set of elementary properties for income movement measures, and show that there is 
essentially only one measure that satisfies all of these properties: the per capita aggregate change in log-
incomes. We demonstrate next that this movement-mobility measure has a number of appealing 
descriptive and normative properties, and provide a formal generalization of our basic characterization 
theorem drawing from the related literature on poverty measurement. Finally, we present here an 
empirical application in which we show by using our new measure that there has been a broad-based 
increase in income movement in the United States between the 1970s and 1980s. 
Keywords 
income movement, poverty, United States 
Disciplines 
Income Distribution | International and Comparative Labor Relations | Labor Economics 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Wiley. Final version published as: Fields, G. S., & Ok, E. A. (1999). Measuring movement of incomes. 
Economica, 66(264), 455-471. 
doi: 10.1111/1468-0335.00183 
Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
Suggested Citation 
Fields, G. S., & Ok, E. A. (1999). Measuring movement of incomes[Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert 
date], from Cornell University, ILR School site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1121 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1121 
Measuring Movement of Incomes        1 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring Movement of Incomes 
 
 
Gary S. Fields 
Cornell University 
 
Efe A. Ok 
New York University 
 
 
Economica (1999), 66, 455-71 
 
 
 
 
We would like to thank Frank Cowell, Valentino Dardanoni, Peter Gottschalk, Jesse Leary, Tony 
Shorrocks, Ed Wolff, two anonymous referees, participants in seminars given at Columbia, 
Cornell, Delaware, New York and Harvard Universities, and especially Roland Bénabou for their 
helpful comments. Support from the Bronfenbrenner Life Course Center at Cornell University 
and the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University is also gratefully 
acknowledged. 
  
Measuring Movement of Incomes        2 
 
Abstract 
 
 We consider a small set of elementary properties for income movement measures, and 
show that there is essentially only one measure that satisfies all of these properties: the per capita 
aggregate change in log-incomes. We demonstrate next that this movement-mobility measure has 
a number of appealing descriptive and normative properties, and provide a formal generalization 
of our basic characterization theorem drawing from the related literature on poverty 
measurement. Finally, we present here an empirical application in which we show by using our 
new measure that there has been a broad-based increase in income movement in the United 
States between the 1970s and 1980s. 
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Introduction 
 
 Income mobility analysis is concerned with measuring the extent of changes in economic 
status of individuals from one time period to another. Such an analysis is dynamic by nature, and 
can take place in either intergenerational or intragenerational contexts. While in the former case 
one usually focuses on how dissimilar are the incomes of the parents from those of their 
offspring, in an intragenerational setting the focus is typically on the income stability of the 
individuals. 
 Most analyses of intragenerational income mobility concentrate on the variation of the 
income shares or rank orders of the individuals throughout the time period under examination.1 
Such studies are obviously of importance, for they are intimately linked to the notion of ‘lifetime 
income inequality’. On the other hand, only a small number of researchers have chosen to focus 
instead on the aggregate variation of the incomes of the individuals (see e.g. Cowell 1985; Fields 
and Ok 1996; and Mitra and Ok 1998). Such an analysis, henceforth called the analysis of 
income movement, gives direct information with regard to the income flux that takes place in the 
society. A measure of income movement, therefore, identifies how unstable the incomes of the 
individuals have been throughout a given time period. Since income instability may cause 
economic insecurity, and clearly corresponds to a particular aspect of the economic conception 
of ‘income mobility’, measures of income movement are useful complements to the traditional 
measures of relative income mobility. 
 Measuring all incomes in real terms, we view aggregate income movement as being built 
up from the real income movements of individuals; this is the basic premise behind the notion of 
income movement. Thus, if the incomes of all individuals stay the same through time, then—and 
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only then—we say that there is no income movement in this society. Moreover, the larger is the 
income change of any one constituent individual, holding others’ incomes constant, the larger is 
aggregate income movement. Consequently, we view income growth as an integral part of the 
notion of aggregate income movement. In particular, since there is no natural upper bound on 
income changes, a given society’s income movement can in principle increase without limit. 
This observation marks clearly the difference of the notion of aggregate income movement from 
other facets of income mobility: the idea of ‘maximum (or perfect) mobility’ that applies to other 
mobility concepts does not apply here. 
 Given this conceptualization of the movement of incomes, our task is to find ways of 
measuring and aggregating individual income changes. In this paper we adopt an axiomatic 
approach in developing such a method of measuring aggregate income movement. In accordance 
with the basic premise noted above, our axioms are formulated with respect to the income 
changes of the income recipients in the economy (as opposed to changes in ranks, quantiles or 
income shares). As such, of the various axiomatic approaches to mobility analysis in the 
literature, our work is most closely related to the approach suggested by Cowell (1985).2 
 We begin our analysis by presenting a set of four elementary properties for income 
movement measures. While two of these properties (scale invariance and symmetry) are quite 
primitive and are satisfied by virtually all mobility measures in use, one of them (multiplicative 
path separability) is a new consistency postulate which appears especially compelling for 
measures of movement. Our final postulate is, on the other hand, a standard additive separability 
property, a counterpart of which is widely used in the analysis of poverty measurement: 
subgroup decomposability. Loosely speaking, this postulate requires that the overall level of 
income movement be computed as a particular weighted average of the movement levels of the 
Measuring Movement of Incomes        5 
 
subpopulations of the society. Since it allows one to determine precisely the contribution of any 
given subgroup of the society to the aggregate income variation, subgroup decomposability 
becomes useful in empirical applications. In this respect, the advantages of mobility measures 
that satisfy this property are identical to those of subgroup decomposable poverty measures; cf. 
Foster et al. (1984). 
 The key properties in the above list of axioms are subgroup decomposability and 
multiplicative path separability. When these are combined with the other two axioms, it turns out 
that there is essentially only one measure that satisfies the aforementioned axioms: the per capita 
aggregate change in log- incomes. This is a particularly simple (descriptive) income movement 
measure which provides a formal justification for concentrating on individuals’ log- incomes in 
mobility analyses. Moreover, it also admits an interesting normative interpretation in terms of the 
Bernoullian social utility function, and is additively decomposable into two parts, one 
attributable to transfer mobility and the other to growth mobility. 
 Given that subgroup decomposability is a very demanding property, we next explore the 
possibility of relaxing this property by following the lead of Foster and Shorrocks (1991). The 
result is a characterization of the class of all income movement measures that satisfy our three 
basic axioms (other than subgroup decomposability) along with three additional postulates. All 
of these additional properties are strictly weaker than subgroup decomposability, and are 
straightforward reflections of the corresponding properties used in the context of inequality and 
poverty measurement. Unfortunately, while the resulting class of movement measures has an 
interesting mathematical structure, it is at the same time inconveniently large. What is more, it is 
not clear how one may go about refining this class further to obtain an operational set of 
movement measures (other than directly imposing the subgroup decomposability property). 
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 In the final section of the paper, we turn to an illustration of how our subgroup-
decomposable income movement measure can be applied. For this purpose, data are drawn from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the United States to compare the extent of 
aggregate income movement between the 1970s and the 1980s, overall and for various 
demographic subgroups. We find a broad-based increase over time in income movement in the 
United States. Incidentally, this observation complements the earlier findings of others, who 
demonstrated that relative mobility in the United States has been unchanged or falling over the 
same period of time. We conclude that, while there was no significant difference in the income 
decile/quintile changes in the 1970s and the 1980s (so rank orders and relative incomes were 
equally stable in these time periods), there was considerably more income flux in the 1980s than 
in the 1970s (so absolute incomes were more unstable in the 1980s). 
 
I. Basic Properties of Movement Measures 
 
 We consider 𝑅++
𝑛  as the space of all income distributions with population size 𝑛 ≥  1. 
Thus, 𝑥 =  (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) ∈  𝑅++
𝑛  represents an income distribution where 𝑥𝑖 is the level of income 
of the ith individual at a given point in time. For any 𝑥 and 𝑦 in 𝑅++
𝑛 , by 𝑥 → 𝑦 we mean that the 
income distribution of the society has evolved from 𝑥 to 𝑦 (i.e. the ith agent’s income has 
changed from 𝑥𝑖 to 𝑦𝑖 for all i) in a given amount of time. 
 An income movement measure (for an 𝑛 −person population) is defined as any function 
𝑚𝑛: 𝑅++
2𝑛  → 𝑅+ that is continuous and surjective. Continuity is a weak regularity condition 
which is hardly objectionable given the usual vagaries of income data. Surjectivity of 𝑚𝑛 is also 
a reasonable requirement since, as we shall see shortly, we consider income growth as a basic 
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component of aggregate income variation. Consequently, it is natural that we be able to trace the 
entire range of a ‘well-behaved’ movement index 𝑚𝑛 by varying individual income changes 
from zero to infinity. At any rate, this assumption is adopted for convenience, and it can be 
relaxed with ease. 
 Let //𝑛 denote the class of all income movement measures on 𝑅++
2𝑛 , and define //≡
∏ //𝑛
∞
𝑛=𝑡 . Since we wish to study the movement measurement problem for populations of 
arbitrary sizes, we take as the primitives of the following axioms the sequences {𝑚𝑛} in //. 
 Scale-invariant movement measures are those that are invariant to changes in scale (like 
doubling all incomes). Formally, they satisfy the following axiom: 
Scale Invariance: For all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛  and 𝜆 >  0, 𝑚𝑛(𝜆𝑥, 𝜆𝑦) = 𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦). 
 Scale invariance introduces a degree of coherence into the measurement exercise by 
ensuring a consistent evaluation of movement when all incomes are simultaneously scaled up or 
down. As noted by Shorrocks (1993), the justification for this property is reminiscent of the 
justification of relative income inequality measures. In particular, scale-invariant measures avoid 
the problem of adjusting currencies in the case of inter-country mobility comparisons. Perhaps 
for this reason, most commonly used mobility measures (whether they target income movement 
or not) are scale-invariant. 
 The next property of movement measures is a symmetry requirement, which states that 
the transformations 𝑥 → 𝑦 and 𝑦 → 𝑥 are equally mobile: 
Symmetry: For all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 , 𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚𝑛(𝑦, 𝑥). 
 The symmetry property is unexceptionable if one does not distinguish between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ movement of incomes. Consider the two processes 𝑥 ≡ (1,2) → (2,3) ≡ 𝑦 and(2,3) →
(1,2). In both of these processes, the rank orders of the individuals are the same and the absolute 
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values of the changes in relative incomes are identical. Therefore, traditional mobility measures, 
such as the rank correlation (Schiller 1977) and the correlation coefficient (McCall 1973), would 
declare these two processes equally mobile. (Indeed, these two indices (along with many others) 
are symmetric.) In the context of the present analysis, on the other hand, these two 
transformations are deemed ‘equally mobile’ for a different reason: each individual in these 
processes is subject to the same monetary income change. Therefore, since when saying 
‘movement of incomes’ we do not distinguish for the moment between moving up and down, we 
posit that 𝑚2(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚2(𝑦, 𝑥). 
 Of course, (1,2) → (2,3) is welfaristically a more desirable transformation than (2,3) →
(1,2). It is important to note, however, that the symmetry axiom takes the welfare evaluations 
based on Pareto optimality (or economic growth) out of mobility measurement analysis. In the 
case of mobility measures that are based on relative incomes or ranks, this is no cause for 
concern. Such measures would simply contend that there is no welfare difference between the 
transformations 𝑥 → 𝑦 and 𝑦 → 𝑥 that arise from the fluidity of the income shares or ranks of 
individuals; the welfare comparison between these two transformations must be performed on 
other grounds. In contrast to such measures, however, movement measures that are based on 
absolute incomes must view income growth/contraction as one of the basic sources of aggregate 
income movement. Consequently, one may argue that it would be desirable to consider (ethical) 
movement measures which would actually distinguish between the transformations 𝑥 → 𝑦 and 
𝑦 → 𝑥, and which would declare the movement that takes place in the former (latter) process 
welfare enhancing (reducing). Yet, this is not a reason to abandon the symmetry axiom. One 
may, after all, wish to know the extent of income flux without attributing to it any welfare 
connotations. Moreover, it turns out that some interesting welfaristic measures can be readily 
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obtained by directionalizing the symmetric movement measures. We shall in fact introduce one 
such directional movement measure in the next section.  
 We now turn to our next axiom, and note it would be desirable to have a movement 
measure that relates the income flux of population subgroups to the income movement of the 
entire population in an operational way. Indeed, just as in the case of poverty analysis, mobility 
studies might benefit from breaking down the population into certain subgroups on the basis of 
ethnic, occupational and/or geographical origin, and then attempting to find out the contribution 
of these subgroups to the total movement in the population (see Section IV). Therefore, the 
movement measures that satisfy the following additivity axiom (familiar from the theory of 
poverty measurement; cf. Foster et al. 1984) are of interest: 
Subgroup Decomposability: Partition the population into 𝐽 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} subgroups and let 𝑛𝑗  stand 
for the number of persons in subgroup 𝑗. For any 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 and 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛𝑗
, 
𝑚𝑛((𝑥
1, … , 𝑥𝐽), (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝐽)) = ∑ (
𝑛𝑗
𝑛
) 𝑚𝑛𝑗(𝑥
𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
 While subgroup decomposability is a widely used property in theories of inequality and 
poverty measurement, to our knowledge it has never been considered in the context of income 
mobility measurement. This is because a vast majority of mobility studies are conducted in terms 
of the movement of relative incomes and/or ranks of the individuals, and therefore they cannot 
be expected to satisfy subgroup decomposability.3 When one’s focus is shifted to absolute 
income changes, however, it is entirely possible to devise movement indices that compute the 
overall movement level as a weighted average of the subgroup movement levels where weights 
are chosen to be the population shares of the subgroups. Notice that subgroup decomposability is 
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after all nothing but a strong form of the basic premise that aggregate income movement is 
obtained simply by aggregating individual levels of movement. 
 As we shall see in Section IV, subgroup decomposability is a property that is particularly 
useful in empirical applications. One should nevertheless note that subgroup decomposability is 
a technically demanding axiom. In Section III, therefore, we shall explore the possibility of 
replacing this axiom with a weaker separability property along the lines of the work of Foster 
and Shorrocks (1991). 
 To introduce the final property we shall discuss in this section, consider an arbitrary 
income distribution 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛 and suppose that all agents in the population experience a particular 
path of income change in the time period under study, namely, a fixed rate of income increase. 
We thus have 𝑥 → 𝛼𝑥 for some 𝛼 > 1. Now suppose we are provided with a further observation 
point in the time interval originally specified; we thus have two consecutive time periods to 
measure the mobility path of the population. Assume that in the first time interval we observe the 
process 𝑥 → 𝛽𝑥 for some 1 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 𝛼. In the second observation period, we shall then observe 
𝛽𝑥 → 𝛼𝑥. In effect, we decompose the process 𝑥 → 𝛼𝑥 into two subprocesses, 𝑥 → 𝛽𝑥 and 𝛽𝑥 →
𝛼𝑥. It seems quite reasonable then that the sum of the movement levels found in the two 
subprocesses should be equal to the total mobility of the mother process. This would, after all, 
introduce a time independence feature to the measurement study with respect to the particular 
(multiplicative) income change paths under consideration. We thus postulate the following 
property: 
Multiplicative Path Separability: For any 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 , 𝛼 ≥ 1 and 𝛽 ∈ [1, 𝛼], 
𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝛼𝑥) = 𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝛽𝑥) + 𝑚𝑛(𝛽𝑥, 𝛼𝑥) 
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 Multiplicative path separability is a weak separability requirement that is posited for a 
very specific (and simple) process of income changes. If all incomes in an economy grow 𝛽-fold 
between times 0 and 1 while they are growing (𝛼 𝛽⁄ )-fold between times 1 and 2, then one 
would presumably want to use a movement measure that would reflect that incomes have, in 
fact, grown exactly 𝛼-fold between times 0 and 2. Measures that satisfy multiplicative path 
separability are designed precisely to meet this requirement. 
 
II. Two Measures of Income Movement 
 
Characterization 
 
 Our first result is that the basic properties introduced above imply a unique income 
mobility measure up to a positive linear transformation: 
Proposition 1. An {𝑚𝑛} ∈// satisfies scale invariance, symmetry, subgroup decomposability and 
multiplicative path separability if, and only if, there exists a constant 𝑐 > 0 such that 
𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑐 (
1
𝑛
∑|log 𝑦𝑖 − log 𝑥𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1
)     for all  𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 ,            𝑛 ≥ 1 
 Although our main interest in this paper is in symmetric indices, it is instructive to note 
how easily Proposition 1 can be modified to yield an analogous characterization of a directional 
movement index. We say that a continuous function 𝑑𝑛: 𝑅++
𝑛 → 𝑅 is a directional movement 
measure if, for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛  and all 𝛼 > 1, the following two properties hold: 
𝑑𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = −𝑑𝑛(𝑦, 𝑥)       and        𝑑𝑛(𝑥, 𝛼𝑥) > 𝑑𝑛(𝑥, 𝑥) 
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 The first property simply says that if 𝑥 → 𝑦 is deemed to exhibit a ‘good’ movement 
overall, then 𝑦 → 𝑥 must be viewed as depicting a ‘bad’ movement in the aggregate. This 
property is clearly the defining feature of a directional movement index. The second property, on 
the other hand, is a natural requirement that forces a directional movement index to view a 
proportional increase in everybody’s incomes as a ‘good’ movement. 
 We denote the set of all directional movement measures defined on 𝑅++
2𝑛  by 𝒟𝑛, and 
define 𝒟 ≡ ∏ 𝒟𝑛
∞
𝑛=1 . The properties considered in the previous subsection are defined for 
directional movement measures in a straightforward manner. The following result is a 
straightforward analogue of Proposition 1: 
Proposition 2. A {𝑑𝑛} ∈ 𝒟 satisfies scale invariance, subgroup decomposability and 
multiplicative path separability if, and only if, there exists a constant 𝑐 > 0 such that 
𝑑𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑐 (
1
𝑛
∑(log 𝑦𝑖 − log 𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
)     for all  𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 ,            𝑛 ≥ 1 
The elementary proofs of these results are found in the Appendix. 
 
Interpretation 
 
Proposition 1 provides an axiomatic justification for the movement measure {𝑚𝑛
∗ } ∈ // defined 
as 
𝑚𝑛
∗ (𝑥, 𝑦) =
1
𝑛
∑|log 𝑦𝑖 − log 𝑥𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛  and 𝑛 ≥ 1. Apart from its formal support articulated in Proposition 1, {𝑚𝑛
∗ } 
has also an interesting interpretation. If one chooses the social utility function for income as 𝑎 →
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log 𝑎 and adopts utilitarianism in computing social welfare, then 𝑚𝑛
∗ (𝑥, 𝑦) corresponds to the per 
capita aggregate change in the individual social utility levels that has been experienced during 
the process 𝑥 → 𝑦.4, 5 
 Consider, for instance, the transformations 𝑥 = (2, 1000) → (3,1000) = 𝑦 and 𝑥 =
(2, 1000) → (2,1001) = 𝑧. Which of these two processes exhibits more income movement? If 
one focuses only on the absolute values of changes in personal incomes (as, for example, the 
movement measure introduced in Fields and Ok 1996 does), then one would conclude that both 
processes exhibit an equal amount of income movement. On the other hand, if one wishes to rank 
the movement contents of these transformations on the basis of changes in individual welfare 
levels, then the law of diminishing returns would argue for 𝑥 → 𝑦 depicting strictly more 
movement than 𝑥 → 𝑧. This is precisely what {𝑚𝑛
∗ } would do: 𝑚𝑛
∗ (𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑚𝑛
∗ (𝑥, 𝑧). Moreover, 
all directional movement measures introduced in Proposition 2 argue that the movement 
observed in 𝑥 → 𝑦 is more desirable than that observed in 𝑥 → 𝑧. This again accords with our 
intuition. 
 Remark 1. The above interpretation of {𝑚𝑛
∗ } brings up a natural generalization. The 
notion of aggregating social utilities is extensively used in the literature on income inequality 
where the social utility function for income is assumed to have constant elasticity, and hence is 
of the form 
𝑈𝜎(𝑎) = {
𝑎1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
,     0 ≤ 𝜎 ≠ 1
log 𝑎 ,             𝜎 = 1
            for all   𝑎 > 0 
Choosing 𝑈𝜎 as the social utility function and adopting utilitarianism in aggregating individual 
levels of social utility yields the subgroup-decomposable movement measure {𝑚𝑛
𝜎 ∈ //}, defined 
as 
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𝑚𝑛
𝜎(𝑥, 𝑦) =
1
𝑛
∑|𝑈𝜎(𝑦𝑖) − 𝑈
𝜎(𝑥𝑖)|
𝑛
𝑖=1
         for all   𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛   and  𝑛 ≥ 1 
The class Σ ≡ {{𝑚𝑛
𝜎}: 1 ≥ 𝜎 ≥ 0} then emerges as an appealing one-parameter class of income 
movement measures. 
 It is clear that the only scale-invariant member of Σ is {𝑚𝑛
1 } = {𝑚𝑛
∗ }, and the only 
translation-invariant member of Σ is {𝑚𝑛
0}, which is precisely the measure characterized in 
Fields and Ok (1996). The rest of the elements of Σ may be thought of as compromise measures 
of aggregate income variation. 
 Remark 2. Another useful property of {𝑚𝑛
∗ } is that it additively disaggregates into two 
components which can be interpreted as total social utility growth and total social utility 
transfer. The first component is easily defined for a process 𝑥 → 𝑦 with a non-negative level of 
economic growth, i.e. with Σ𝑦𝑖 ≥ Σ𝑥𝑖. Adopting the utilitarian conventions outlined above, the 
per capita social welfare change that comes about during 𝑥 → 𝑦 is (Σ log 𝑦𝑖 ≥ Σ log 𝑥𝑖) 𝑛⁄ . 
Turning to the second component, total social utility transfer can be thought of as twice the 
social utility lost by the losers. To see this more clearly, let us define the set of all individuals 
whose income decreased during the process as 𝐿 ≡ {𝑖: 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑦𝑖}. 𝐿 is then the set of all losers’. Of 
course, the social utility loss of an 𝑖 ∈ 𝐿 is log 𝑥𝑖 − log 𝑦𝑖 so that the total social utility lost by 
‘losers’ is ∑ (log 𝑥𝑖 − log 𝑦𝑖)𝑖∈𝐿 . Yet, because the economy grew, every util lost by a loser is 
gained by a winner, and thus one may think ‘as if’ ∑ (log 𝑥𝑖 − log 𝑦𝑖)𝑖∈𝐿  amount of social utility 
is transferred from losers to winners.6 Consequently, 2 ∑ (log 𝑥𝑖 − log 𝑦𝑖 /𝑛)𝑖∈𝐿  can be thought of 
as the per capita total social utility that has ‘changed hands’. Given this interpretation, we have 
the following decomposition for a growing economy: For all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛  and 𝑛 ≥ 1, 
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𝑚𝑛
∗ (𝑥, 𝑦) =
1
𝑛
∑(log 𝑦𝑖 − log 𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
+
2
𝑛
∑(log 𝑥𝑖 − log 𝑦𝑖)
𝑖∈𝐿
 
(An analogous decomposition holds also in the case of a contracting economy.) The sources of 
aggregate income variation can thus be gauged by disaggregating {𝑚𝑛
∗ } into two components, 
one attributable to economic growth and one attributable to transfer of incomes. This is 
reminiscent of decomposing total social mobility into exchange and structural mobility 
components, a problem that is widely studied in the related sociological literature.7 
 Remark 3. It is important to note that the very notion of ‘income mobility’ is really 
multidimensional, and therefore no single movement index can be expected to measure all 
aspects of mobility satisfactorily, {𝑚𝑛
∗ } is no exception. While it offers a meaningful way of 
assessing the aggregate fluctuations of individual incomes through time, it is, for instance, 
insensitive to the re-rankings of individuals. To illustrate, consider the simple transformation 𝑥 ≡
(10,20) → (10 + 𝜀, 20 = 𝜀) ≡ 𝑦(𝜀), 0 ≤ 𝜀 ≤ 10. In accordance with our intuition, 𝑚2
∗(𝑥, 𝑦(𝜀)) 
is a strictly increasing function of 𝜀 on [0, 5]. Interestingly, this particular movement of incomes 
would almost entirely be missed by any mobility measure based on quantile transition matrices 
(like the widely used immobility ratio). Indeed, since the transition matrix associated with the 
process 𝑥 → 𝑦(𝜀) is simply 
[
1 0
0 1
] 
for all 0 ≤ 𝜀 < 5 (where the first (second) group consists of the richer (poorer) individual), any 
such measure would declare the process 𝑥 → 𝑦(𝜀) ‘completely immobile’ for all 0 ≤ 𝜀 < 5.8 On 
the other hand, 𝑚2
∗(𝑥, 𝑦(𝜀)) is a continuous function of 𝜀 on [0, 5], although one may actually 
wish to have a jump discontinuity at 𝜀 = 5; for the initially poorer individual is no longer the 
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poorest at 𝜀 = 5: a rank reversal has taken place. This would, in turn, be picked up by the 
transition matrix approach, since the mobility matrix associated with 𝑥 → 𝑦(𝜀) is 
[
0 1
1 0
] 
for all 5 < 𝜀 ≤ 10. 
 The upshot is that the mobility measurement technique we propose here and the standard 
approach based on quantile transition matrices and on relative incomes are essentially 
complementary. While the former concentrates on individual relative income movements, the 
latter measures the extent of re-rankings (usually in terms of quantiles, deciles, etc.). Mobility 
analyses that focus on aggregate income variation, therefore, would be enriched if both 
methodologies were simultaneously employed.9 
 Remark 4. The multidimensionality of the notion of mobility makes it impossible to 
devise a fundamental axiom that would unify all axiomatic inquiries that pertain to mobility 
measurement. This contrasts sharply with the theory of inequality measurement in which the 
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle plays a central role. However, it is conceivable that a 
fundamental axiom can be devised with respect to specific facets of mobility such as income 
movement. In the present conceptualization, we contend that a fundamental axiom would be one 
that preconditions aggregate (directional or nondirectional) movement to be built up from the 
real income changes of individuals. (This property is formalized as the ‘weak decomposability’ 
axiom below.) At the very least, this premise, a strong version of which is the property of 
subgroup decomposability, is the starting point of the present work. 
 The literature provides three alternative axioms as candidates for a fundamental axiom of 
movement mobility: monotonicity (Shorrocks 1978a), the axiom of diagonalizing switches 
(Atkinson 1981), and monotonicity in distance (Cowell 1985). The first two of these axioms are 
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formulated in terms of transition matrices, and thus are not immediately applicable to our 
framework. Yet, as shown in Fields and Ok (1996, Sections 5.2-5.4), {𝑚𝑛
∗ }, and all measures in 
the class Σ, satisfy suitable reformulations of these three axioms.10 
 
III. A Generalization: Subgroup-Consistent Measures of Income Movement 
 
 As noted earlier, while subgroup decomposability is quite desirable for empirical 
applications, it is a technically demanding property which postulates an additive structure for 
indices in a rather ad hoc manner. It is therefore not surprising that this axiom is weakened to 
subgroup consistency in the literature on axiomatic poverty measurement (Foster and Shorrocks 
1991). In this section, we shall explore the implications of such a weakening for income 
movement measures. 
 Subgroup decomposability encompasses three distinct properties of movement measures. 
Weak Decomposability: For all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 , 
𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐺𝑛(𝑚1(𝑥1, 𝑦1), … , 𝑚1(𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛)) 
for some symmetric and strictly increasing 𝐺𝑛: 𝑅+
𝑛 → 𝑅+, 𝑛 ≥ 2. 
Replication Invariance: For all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 , and 𝑘 = 1,2, … 
𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑚𝑘𝑛((𝑥, … 𝑥), (𝑦, … , 𝑦)) 
Subgroup Consistency: For all 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑤 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛1  and 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗, 𝑧∗, 𝑤∗ ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛2  
𝑚𝑛1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑚𝑛1(𝑧, 𝑤)       𝑎𝑛𝑑        𝑚𝑛2(𝑥
∗, 𝑦∗) ≥ 𝑚𝑛2(𝑧
∗, 𝑤∗) 
imply 
𝑚𝑛1+𝑛2((𝑥, 𝑥
∗), (𝑦, 𝑦∗)) > 𝑚𝑛1+𝑛2((𝑧, 𝑧
∗), (𝑤, 𝑤∗)) 
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 Weak decomposability is an axiom of nonpaternalism which asserts that total movement 
is a monotonic function of the individual income variations (cf. Cowell 1985). (The symmetry of 
this function guarantees the impartial treatment of individuals; the interpretation of strict 
monotonicity is straightforward.) As we have noted above, this axiom reflects the fundamental 
premise behind the notion of ‘aggregate income movement’. Replication invariance, on the other 
hand, is again a requirement, the analogues of which are widely used in the literatures on 
inequality and poverty measurement; it simply preconditions a movement index to view the 
aggregate income variation in per capita terms. Finally, subgroup consistency is a compelling 
property which posits that overall income movement should increase whenever a subgroup of the 
population experiences a rise in movement keeping the movement level of the rest of the society 
unaltered. 
 It is clear that a subgroup-decomposable movement index necessarily satisfies weak 
decomposability, replication invariance and subgroup consistency. The converse, however, is 
evidently invalid. It is thus of interest to see how Proposition 1 would be modified if one 
replaced subgroup decomposability by these three properties. This query leads us to the 
following observation: 
Proposition 3. An {𝑚𝑛
∗ } ∈ // satisfies scale invariance, symmetry, weak decomposability, 
replication invariance, subgroup consistency and multiplicative path separability if, and only if, 
there exists a strictly increasing and continuous function 𝐹: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+ such that 
𝑚𝑛(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐹 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐹−1(|log 𝑦𝑖 − log 𝑥𝑖|)
𝑛
𝑖=1
)      for all  𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 ,        𝑛 ≥ 1 
 Proposition 3 shows that replacing subgroup decomposability with weak 
decomposability, replication invariance and subgroup consistency expands considerably the class 
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of movement measures captured by Proposition 1. The resulting class has an interesting 
structure; it contains, for instance, all the movement measures in {{𝑚𝑛,𝛼} ∈ //∶ 𝛼 > 0} where 
𝑚𝑛,𝛼(𝑥, 𝑦) = (
1
𝑛
∑|log 𝑦𝑖 − log 𝑥𝑖|
𝛼
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
1 𝛼⁄
 
for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛 . (This subclass is clearly reminiscent of the widely used 𝑃𝛼− class of poverty 
indices.) In particular, {𝑚𝑛,1} = {𝑚𝑛
∗ }; that is, {𝑚𝑛,1} is precisely the measure that is 
characterized by Proposition 1 (with 𝑐 = 1). 
 Unfortunately, the class of measures characterized in Proposition 3 is too large to be 
useful in applications. It is clear that one must use an additional property for movement measures 
to ‘refine’ this class further in order to obtain some applicable measures. Subgroup 
decomposability is, for instance, one such property. The imposition of it ‘refines’ this class to a 
singleton consisting only of {𝑚𝑛
∗ }. It is not readily apparent, however, which other properties can 
be used for this purpose. In particular, how one may improve upon Proposition 3 to provide a 
complete characterization of the class {{𝑚𝑛,𝛼}: 𝛼 > 0} is at present an open problem.
11 
 
IV. An Empirical Application 
 
 To illustrate how the movement measure {𝑚𝑛
∗ } can be applied, we consider the case of 
income mobility in the United States, where the common contention is that relative income 
mobility either did not change or fell between the 1970s and the 1980s. While Hungerford (1993) 
and Gittleman and Joyce (1995, 1996) maintain that the mobility rates were ‘rather stable’ in this 
period, Buchinsky and Hunt (1996) reported a ‘sharp decrease’ in wage and earnings mobility 
over time from 1979 to 1991. The works of Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) and Gittleman et al 
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(1997), on the other hand, report a ‘slight fall’ in earnings mobility in the same period.12 (See 
Gottschalk 1997 for a survey.) 
 It is important to note that all of these concentrate either on the movement of the income 
ranks of the individuals or on the movement of their relative incomes. In particular, it is not 
possible to learn anything from these studies with regard to the comparison of the directional or 
nondirectional movement of absolute incomes (as measured in dollars) between 1970s and 
1980s. In this section we shall report our findings with regard to this particular aspect of income 
mobility by using the measurement methodology we have developed in the preceding sections. 
 We use precisely the same extract from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
that Hungerford used; we thank him for making this data set available to us.13 Our main finding 
is that the extent of movement of absolute incomes, as measured by {𝑚𝑛
∗ }, increased in the 
United States from 0.498 during the 1969-76 period to 0.528 in the 1979-86 period—an increase 
of 6%, which is statistically significant at conventional levels. Perhaps even more interestingly, 
as measured by any directional movement measure of Proposition 2, we find that the aggregate 
change in welfare during 1969-76 was significantly positive, while the aggregate change in 
welfare during 1979-86 was significantly negative.14 
 These findings complement those of the earlier papers cited above. While the aggregate 
quintile order changes and the movement of relative incomes were (slightly) larger in the 1970s 
than in the 1980s, there was more income flux overall (and within quintiles) in the 1980s than in 
the 1970s. Moreover, as also suggested by many other authors, we contend that the income 
movement observed in the 1969-76 period was welfaristically more desirable than that observed 
in the 1979-86 period. 
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 We have also calculated the income movement for different demographic groups in the 
population; these are displayed in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1. Our main finding on this 
regard is that the income flux increased between the 1970s and the 1980s for all but the two 
middle educational groups. (For these two, the value of {𝑚𝑛
∗ } remained roughly the same.) This 
tells us that the increase in income movement in the United States was not confined to certain 
demographic groups, but rather was widespread throughout the US population. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
 Finally, by using the subgroup decomposability property of {𝑚𝑛
∗ }, we are able to 
decompose the aggregate (absolute) income movement in each decade as follows. Take the log-
dollar movements in Table 1 for the different demographic groups; multiply them by the 
weighted fraction of persons in group j in the total sample (‘weighted’ to reflect the non-random 
selection of individuals in the US population into the PSID); and normalize them so that the 
weights sum to 100% for each demographic cut. (These weights appear in columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 1.) The change in log-dollar movement in the whole sample is then decomposed for each 
separate partition in column (5). 
 Looking at the last column of Table 1, our findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. More of the increase in income movement is accounted for by males than by females, 
even though females constituted a somewhat larger share of the (weighted) PSID sample 
than did males. 
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2. More of the increase in income movement is accounted for by nonwhites than by 
whites—despite the fact that the (weighted) share of nonwhites in the PSID sample was 
only 14%. 
3. The increase in income movement is accounted for entirely by persons with high school 
educations or above. High school dropouts actually contributed to a decrease in flux 
between the 1970s and 1980s. 
4. More of the increase in income movement is accounted for by young adults than by 
prime-age adults. 
 Finally, we note that, as measured by any directional movement measure of Proposition 
2, the aggregate change in welfare during 1969-76 was positive for both whites and nonwhites, 
while the aggregate change in welfare during 1979-86 was negative for both of these subgroups. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, our main focus was a particular aspect of the multi-faceted notion of 
income mobility: the movement (flux) of absolute incomes. We considered a small set of 
elementary properties for income movement measures, and showed that there is essentially only 
one measure that satisfies all of these properties: the per capita aggregate change in log-
incomes. We demonstrated next that this movement-mobility measure has a number of appealing 
descriptive and normative properties, and provided a formal generalization of our basic 
characterization theorem drawing from the related literature on poverty measurement. Finally, 
we presented an empirical application in which we showed, by using our new measure, that there 
was a broad-based increase in income movement in the United States between the 1970s and 
1980s. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 Since sufficiency can be readily verified, we focus only on necessity. Take any {𝑚𝑛} ∈
 // which satisfies the hypotheses of the proposition. By subgroup decomposability, we must 
have 
 
 
 But by relativity, 𝑚1(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑚1(1, 𝑏 𝑎⁄ ) for all , 𝑏 > 0 , so that we have 
 
 
where 𝑓(𝑎) = 𝑚1(1, 𝑎) for all 𝑎 > 0. By continuity of 𝑚1, 𝑓 is also continuous on 𝑅++. On the 
other hand, multiplicative path separability implies that 𝑚1(1, 𝑎𝑏) = 𝑚1(1, 𝑎) + 𝑚1(𝑎, 𝑎𝑏) for 
all 𝑎, 𝑏 > 1; that is, 𝑓(𝑎𝑏) = 𝑓(𝑎)  + 𝑓(𝑏) for all 𝑎, 𝑏 > 1. This is Cauchy’s third functional 
equation on the restricted domain (1, ∞), the unique solution of which is well known to be 
𝑓(𝑎) = 𝑐 log 𝑎 for all 𝑎 > 1, where 𝑐 is an arbitrary positive constant. Moreover, by symmetry 
and scale invariance, for any 𝑎 ∈ (0,1) we have 
 𝑓(𝑎) = 𝑚1(1, 𝑎) = 𝑚1(𝑎, 1) = 𝑚1(1, 1 𝑎⁄ ) = 𝑓(1 𝑎⁄ ) = −𝑐 log 𝑎 
 But, by continuity of 𝑓, 𝑓(1) = 0 holds, and therefore, we may conclude that there exists 
a 𝑐 > 0 such that 𝑓(𝑎) = 𝑐|log 𝑎| for all 𝑎 > 0. 
 
 
 
 
Measuring Movement of Incomes        25 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 The proof of this result is analogous to that of Proposition 1, and is thus omitted. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 Since the proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 1 of Foster and Shor- 
rocks (1991), we shall provide here only a sketch of the basic argument. For this, we need 
Lemma A. Let {𝑚𝑛} ∈ // be a subgroup-decomposable movement measure such that 
 
for some symmetric and strictly increasing 𝐺𝑛: 𝑅+
𝑛 → 𝑅+, 𝑛 ≥ 2. For any 𝑢, 𝑢
∗ ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛1  and 𝑣, 𝑣∗ ∈
𝑅++
𝑛2  
 
 
 Proof. (ii) immediately follows from (i). To see (i), notice that, by surjectivity of 𝑚1 we 
may choose 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑤 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛1  and 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗ ∈ 𝑅++
𝑛2  such that 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑚1(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖), 𝑢𝑖
∗ = 𝑚1(𝑧𝑖, 𝑤𝑖) and 
𝑣𝑗 = 𝑚1(𝑥𝑗
∗, 𝑦𝑗
∗) for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛1 and 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛2. Let 𝑛 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2. Since, by subgroup 
consistency, 𝑚𝑛1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑚𝑛1(𝑧, 𝑤) implies 𝑚𝑛((𝑥, 𝑥
∗), (𝑦, 𝑦∗)) > 𝑚𝑛((𝑧, 𝑥
∗), (𝑤, 𝑦∗)) it 
follows that 
𝐺𝑛1(𝑢) > 𝐺𝑛1(𝑢
∗) ⇒ 𝐺𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣) > 𝐺𝑛(𝑢
∗, 𝑣) 
To show that the converse of this observation also holds, let 𝑚𝑛((𝑥, 𝑥
∗), (𝑦, 𝑦∗)) = 𝐺𝑛(𝑢, 𝑣) >
𝐺𝑛(𝑢
∗, 𝑣) = 𝑚𝑛((𝑧, 𝑥
∗), (𝑤, 𝑦∗)). By the previous observation, 𝐺𝑛1(𝑢) ≥ 𝐺𝑛1(𝑢
∗) must be the 
case. In fact, this inequality must hold strictly, for if 𝐺𝑛1(𝑢) = 𝐺𝑛1(𝑢
∗), then 𝑚𝑛1(𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑚𝑛1(𝑧, 𝑤) , and by subgroup consistency and symmetry of 𝐺𝑛+𝑛1 we obtain the following 
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contradiction: 
 
 
 
The sufficiency part of Proposition 3 can be readily verified; we prove only the necessity part. 
Let {𝑚𝑛} ∈ // satisfy the hypotheses of the proposition. By weak decom- posability and 
continuity of 𝑚𝑛, 
 
for some symmetric, strictly increasing and continuous 𝐺𝑛: 𝑅+
𝑛 → 𝑅+, 𝑛 ≥ 2. By Lemma A(ii), 
𝐺𝑛 induces an independent ordering in the sense of Debreu (1960) for any 𝑛 ≥ 2. Moreover, this 
ordering is obviously essential (again in the sense of Debreu 1960), since 𝐺𝑛 is not a constant 
function by hypothesis. Therefore, by Debreu’s additive representation theorem (Debreu 1960, 
Theorem 3), there exist strictly increasing and continuous functions 𝐹𝑛: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+, 𝑛 ≥ 2 and 
𝑔𝑛: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+, 𝑛 ≥ 2 such that 𝐺𝑛(𝑢) = 𝐹𝑛(Σ𝑔𝑛(𝑢𝑖)) for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛, 𝑛 ≥ 3. 
 By Lemma A(i), we have 
 
 
for any 𝑢, 𝑢∗ ∈ 𝑅++
2  and 𝑎 > 0. Therefore, defining 𝑔2 ≡ 𝑔3, we can conclude that 𝐺𝑛(𝑢) =
𝐹𝑛(Σ𝑔𝑛(𝑢𝑖)) for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛, for some strictly increasing and continuous functions 𝐹𝑛: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+ 
and 𝑔𝑛: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+, 𝑛 ≥ 2. But then, where ℎ𝑛 = 𝑛𝑔𝑛 for all 𝑛 ≥ 2, we can write 
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 Furthermore, one can show by replication invariance that we must have 𝐹𝑛 = 𝐹𝑛′ and 
ℎ𝑛 = ℎ𝑛′ for all 𝑛, 𝑛′ ≥ 2. (This step is identical to the derivation of equation (21) from (14) in 
Foster and Shorrocks 1991, pp. 694-5.) So, 𝐺𝑛(𝑢) = 𝐹𝑛(Σℎ(𝑢𝑖)/𝑛) for all 𝑢 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑛, 𝑛 ≥ 2 for 
some strictly increasing and continuous 𝐹: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+ and ℎ: 𝑅+ → 𝑅+; that is, by weak 
decomposability, 
 
 
But by replication invariance, 
 
 
for all 𝑎, 𝑏 > 0 and 𝑛 > 2. Thus, since {𝑚1(𝑎, 𝑏): 𝑎, 𝑏 > 0} = 𝑅+ by surjectivity of 𝑚1 we have 
𝐹 ∘ ℎ = 𝐼; i.e. ℎ = 𝐹−1. Moreover, that 𝑚1(𝑎, 𝑏) = |log 𝑏 − log 𝑎| can easily be established as 
in the proof of Proposition 1. 
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Notes 
 
1. By ‘relative income’, we mean the individual’s share of the total income. 
2. Among other axiomatic approaches to mobility measurement are Chakravarty et al. 
(1985); King (1983); Geweke et al. (1986); Shorrocks (1978a, 1993); and Van de Gaer et 
al. (1998). 
3. Examples include the correlation coefficient, the fraction of people changing more than 
one income quantile (Lillard and Willis 1978), Hart’s index (Hart 1981), Bartholomew’s 
index (Bartholomew 1982), Shorrocks’ index for two periods (Shorrocks, 1978b) and the 
Maasoumi-Zandvakili index for two periods (Maasoumi and Zandvakili 1986). 
4. The notion of social utility is commonly taken in welfare economics either as the social 
income evaluation function of the social planner acting as a social norm, or as the utility 
of the representative agent of the society. 
5. This particular interpretation of {𝑚𝑛
∗ } is analogous to that of the Watts index of poverty; 
see Atkinson (1987) and Zheng (1993). 
6. The notion of a ‘utility transfer’ is well recognized to be problematic, for it envisages the 
cardinal full comparability of preferences. This is, however, less of an issue for the 
present analysis, for our interpretation of {𝑚𝑛
∗ } is already based on the premiss of 
representing individual preferences by a single social utility function for income. We 
stress that the issue here is one of ‘interpretation’; a nonutilitarian (or an adherent of risk-
loving behaviour) would understandably disregard the conclusions based on this 
interpretation. Indeed, Proposition 1 allows {𝑚𝑛
∗ } to be treated simply as a ‘descriptive’ 
measure of income mobility with no underlying welfare content. 
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7. See, among others, Bartholomew (1982) and Markandya (1982, 1984). 
8. Similarly, the correlation coefficient (which is a relative mobility measure) deems the 
extent of mobility independent of the value of 𝜀: Cor(𝑥, 𝑦(𝜀)) = 1 for all 𝜀 ∈ [0,5). So, 
the correlation coefficient too (like all other measures that are based on relative incomes) 
fails to capture the ‘movement’ aspect of mobility satisfactorily. 
9. This is analogous to using the head count and poverty gap measures together to get a 
more complete picture of the extent of economic poverty. The head count ratio is 
reminiscent of the immobility ratio (or any other trace-based index) in that it is 
insensitive to income movements within the poor class while being discontinuous at the 
poverty line. On the other hand, the poverty gap measure resembles {𝑚𝑛
∗ }, for it is a 
continuous measure which is not particularly sensitive to income movements that carry 
individuals above the poverty line. 
10. While the discussion in Fields and Ok (1996) is limited to {𝑚𝑛
0}, the arguments are easily 
seen to extend to all members of Σ. As a caveat, however, we note that our approach is 
consistent with Atkinson’s diagonalizing switches axiom only when a diagonalizing 
switch occurs on the diagonal (see the discussion in Fields and Ok 1996, pp. 364-5.) 
11. We note that the notion of compatibility introduced by Foster and Shorrocks (1991) to 
characterize the 𝑃𝛼− class is of no help in characterizing {{𝑚𝑛,𝛼}: 𝛼 > 0}. Indeed, in 
contrast with what Foster and Shorrocks establish for poverty indices (see their 
Proposition 7), one can show that there does not exist a translation invariant movement 
measure that is compatible (see their definition on p. 704) with a measure of the form 
characterized in Proposition 3. 
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12. Hungerford’s conclusion was based on three measures applied to data from the Michigan 
PSID: the lambda asymmetric stastistic, Cramer’s V, and the contingency coefficient. 
Gittleman and Joyce used the extent of movement across earnings quintiles in successive 
rounds of the Current Population Survey, and the correlation coefficient between income 
in one year and income in the next. Buchinsky and Hunt based their analysis on the 
average quintile jump and the mean of the reciprocal exit times in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Finally, both Moffitt and Gottschalk and Gittleman et al. 
calculated the sum of the off-diagonal elements in quintile transition matrices for the 
PSID. It should also be noted that all of these studies except Hungerford use earnings (or 
wages) as the basis for the analysis, while our present focus is on income mobility. As an 
anonymous referee rightly observed, this distinction is important because the relationship 
between income and earnings mobility is not transparent. See Shorrocks (1981) and 
Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) for a discussion of this issue. 
13. Hungerford’s unit of observation is the individual, weighted by the PSID sampling 
weights. Individuals are assigned the real total income (including income from cash 
transfers) of the families to which they belong. To be included in these calculations for 
the 1970s, the individual must have had a valid income observation in 1969 and 1976; for 
the 1980s, income observations must have been available for 1979 and 1986. All income 
figures are in 1982-4 dollars. 
14. Several other observations of this nature are reported in a companion paper (Fields et al. 
1998), which also contains an appendix detailing the analysis of the statistical 
significance of these results. 
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